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Prior to 1980, Chinese population movements were severely limitedby residence registers, both rural (rural hukou) and urban (non-ruralhukou). (1) However, while about 80 percent of the population lived in
the countryside in the early 1980s, China’s urban population officially
passed the 50 percent mark in 2011, evidence of a historically unprece-
dented rural exodus. (2)
China initially experienced increasing migration with the industrial boom
in the coastal areas since the 1980s, and the growing need for manpower. (3)
Rural inhabitants were gradually able to leave their villages, but without the
hukou system being abolished. (4) Migrants working in the city without legal
residence permits were unable to access the social services available to the
urban population. (5) They therefore made up a continuously increasing
“floating” population, currently estimated at over 220 million people. (6)
A second high point of urbanisation in China was reached in the early
1990s with the expansion of the cities. (7) Between 1996 and 2006, the area
of land occupied by Chinese cities grew by 50 percent, (8) and over 80 per-
cent of urban expansion took place in the developed regions of the east
through the requisition of arable land. (9) In statistical terms, former rural
dwellers who in this way suddenly acquire the status of urban residents can
be seen as part of the rural population migrating to cities. However, in re-
ality, it is the cities that are “eating up” their land. (10)
The government has gradually transformed the “rural hukou” among this
population into “non-rural hukou,” marking their definitive emergence from
the status of peasants. However, these former rural dwellers are not con-
sidered “landless.” (11) Instead, this new urban population stands apart from
peasant migrants because it has experienced the process of urbanisation in
a radically different way: it has become urban without migrating (whereas
a large number of migrants struggle to acquire urban status while keeping
land in the village where their hukou is registered). This change of status
without migration might accounts for 40  percent of urbanisation in
China. (12)
The political implications of requisitions
The differentiation between urban and rural populations established by
the Chinese Communist Party helped to divide ownership of the land into
two broad categories: urban land, which the state holds, and rural lands,
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ABSTRACT: This article is based on a field survey conducted in a village whose lands were expropriated, its homes destroyed, and its
inhabitants relocated to two blocks of flats built about a hundred metres from the village, and in which new neighbourhood adminis-
trations were set up. Supervision of the evictions by local authorities seems crucial in the process of adapting former villagers to their
status as urban dwellers. However, the interactions between cadres and people in their new urban setting cannot be understood without
taking into account the resistance that preceded the eviction, a resistance that we will seek to reconstruct.
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which are owned “collectively” by village communes. (13) Since the beginning
of the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping and the dismantling of the com-
munes, the state has progressively strengthened the protection of private
property, which was written into the Chinese Constitution in 2007.
However, private ownership of property is recognised only in urban areas,
contributing to a system of private property in the city that is at odds with
a system of collective ownership in the country.(14) In the city, the state
owns the land, but private ownership of property is recognised. In rural areas,
land has been registered since the 1950s under collective ownership. Farm-
ers have only the usufruct of land allocated among all the inhabitants of
the village for the construction of housing or for agriculture. Thus, farmers
cannot freely sell the land they cultivate or on which their homes are built
because they are not the owners, while the state may requisition such land
without there being “expropriation” in legal terms. With the transition from
a planned economy to a market economy, requisition of rural land has
meant for rural communities a form of nationalisation, rather than the pri-
vatisation of their principal means of production, the land. However, farmers
are all the more inclined to resist local authorities for the preservation of
land they consider as belonging to them collectively. (15)
Chinese urban expansion has come about by the expansion of cities into
rural peri-urban areas, involving massive rural land requisition. (16) Since the
strengthening of economic reforms in 1992, about 3 million farmers per
year have seen their collective land requisitioned, or about 60 million people
since the resumption of reforms. (17) In order to transfer agricultural land to
non-agricultural use, local authorities must seek the approval of the Ministry
of Land Management to convert agricultural land to urban land. (18)
However, between 1995 and 2005, about 600,000 cases of violation of
peasants’ rights were recorded by the People’s Supreme Court. (19) Over the
same period, 65 percent of “mass protests” are said to have been linked to
expropriation problems. (20) From this point of view, resistance to expropria-
tion, regularly reported in the press and in documentary films, (21) can be seen
as a manifestation of social instability that challenges political legitimacy,
at least that of local authorities who profit from the transfers of land. (22)
A large number of analyses of urbanisation deal with the problems of req-
uisition, with the possibilities of complaint in the rural world, (23) and with
the enrichment of cadres. (24) But there are very few studies that take into
account the power relations underlying the expropriations as a stage in the
process of transformation of rural communities in China into a new urban
class. On this question, Xu Ying et al. write that there is a “lack of compre-
hensive understanding about how the rural population, despite now being
housed in and surrounded by an urban setting, has gradually adapted to or
resisted the forces of urbanisation instigated by the state.” (25) This article
will therefore attempt to show the connections between the disappearance
of the peasantry, the complaints procedures in China, and the formation of
a new urban population through a survey of the requisition of agricultural
land and the destruction of a village, followed by the relocation of all its
residents to two apartment blocks a few hundred meters from the original
site of the village. We will then seek to understand how the repression of
the people determines their adaptation to the urban life imposed on them.
Presentation of the village and of the survey
History of the village
Before 2008, the village of Xiaodao (26) (Xiaodao cun) was located on the
island of Xiaodao (Xiaodao dao), in the district of Haizhu (Haizhu qu) in a
peri-urban area of Guangzhou, in the Pearl River Delta. There was no bridge
to the opposite shores, and the village was known in the area as “the poor
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village” (qiongcun), because of its isolation. Consisting of three hamlets, it
had 2,000 inhabitants of the same clan, the Huangs, represented by a single
ancestral temple on the island. (27)
The village also included a hundred overseas Chinese (Huaqiao), living
mainly in Hong Kong, who, thanks to the opening up measures since the
1980, had been able to recover property expropriated in the early years of
the communist regime, and in some cases invest in the construction of new
houses. (28) In addition, a state enterprise was built in the early 1980s, with
four plants dedicated to fishing and related activities (maintenance of boats,
fish processing, etc.) on a portion of the land on the island away from the
village. Two blocks of flats were built on the island to accommodate more
than 350 families of workers who were employed there. Because of their
jobs, they held non-rural hukou and benefited from state welfare (social
contributions, retirement pensions, unemployment benefits, a medical cen-
tre and primary school reserved for factory workers). These workers thus
formed a separate community. (29)
The peasants who constituted about 75 percent of the inhabitants of the is-
land were therefore at the bottom of the social scale, and did not receive social
assistance because of their rural status. (30) The conditions of village life im-
proved significantly in the 1980s with the establishment of the Family Re-
sponsibility System.(31) Many farmers then abandoned vegetable crops in favour
of planting fruit trees. Surplus manpower was able to go to work in the city,
returning only to harvest the fruit crops, which were sold at a good price due
to the proximity of urban markets. The isolation of the island became an asset
for agriculture in an area in full expansion, (32) and the villagers began for the
first time in decades to invest in the construction of new houses. (33)
At the same time, construction projects increased in the district: some vil-
lages were deprived of their agricultural land, while others were completely
destroyed. A dozen villages opposite the island were expelled in the early
2000s for the construction of the University City of Guangdong, which now
has more than 100,000 students, several stadiums, a hospital, and a few
houses of a traditional village transformed into a tourist park. (34) The largest
exhibition centre in China, which hosts many international fairs throughout
the year, was also built less than a mile from the village. (35)
Finally, the village was overtaken in the 2000s by the surrounding urban-
isation. The extension of the metro line from Guangdong arrived on the is-
land, and a tunnel connecting the island to the opposite banks was begun.
In 2004, the district authorities announced that the island of Xiaodao was
to be requisitioned for an “International Ecological Island” construction proj-
ect. At the end of 2005, the fish factory closed down and the fields were
razed, and at the end of 2008, the farmers were evicted and moved into
two blocks of flats built just opposite the island. A hundred villagers refused
to sign the displacement agreement and took refuge in the temple of their
ancestors, a National Heritage building, as well as in the homes of the
Huaqiao, which had not yet been destroyed because these people living
abroad were supposed to be entitled to extraordinary compensation, which
had not yet been decided in October 2012.
In May 2012, when I last visited, two parks with artificial hills to admire
the view and a bike path along the water had been constructed, and tourists
could rent bicycles at the subway exit, stop at a Western-style bar, and visit
the model of the construction project of the island, on which it is clearly
intended to build villas and luxury homes.
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Conditions of the survey
I made two trips to the island of Xiaodao, in 2007 and 2008, before the
eviction of the village. I met a couple of workers who, having befriended
several farmers, became my informants and allowed me access to the
homes of villagers in the blocks of flats. I returned for stays in 2009, 2011,
and 2012, in order to investigate the adaptation of the villagers to their
blocks of flats in the suburbs of Guangzhou.
Thirty interviews were conducted with villagers and former fish factory
workers. Over the years, these people gave me a number of documents re-
lating to requisitions, including 57 complaints and letters of response from
the authorities (see Table 1), hundreds of documents in legal files, 14 internal
documents concerning the carrying out of requisitions, several maps of the
island, photographs and videos taken with their mobile phones during the
requisitions of the village, and 17 clippings of newspaper articles.
However, my presence strongly disturbed the authorities, and only people
dissatisfied with the expulsion dared to speak to me. In 2009, shortly after
the relocation, I was simply denied access to the blocks of flats. I returned
in 2011 and 2012. Residents invited me to eat at their homes, but a few
days later they were questioned. The police probably feared that I was a
journalist, because they tried to find out what questions I had asked and
they asked my interlocutors if they had “talked to the foreigner about the
problems of the village.” I had introduced myself to people who received
me as a teacher interested in Chinese traditional culture, an explanation
they repeated to the authorities, who were apparently reassured enough to
not come and intimidate me directly. (36)
My interlocutors nevertheless stopped inviting me to their homes, some
deciding that it was better not to talk to me at all, even outside the build-
ings. I thought then that my investigation of the adaptation of people to
their new housing block was going to be unsuccessful. In this context it was
even more difficult for me to get the perspective of people satisfied with
the relocation or that of the village cadres.
But I continued to meet with workers who had been rehoused in the sub-
urbs and with the remaining inhabitants who were holding out on the island,
where, strangely enough, I was able to circulate much more freely than in
the new apartment blocks. Finally one of the locals gave me the contact
details of a couple of Huaqiao residing in Hong Kong, who had initiated a
lawsuit against the authorities after the destruction of their two houses
that were on the route of the tunnel. My investigation thus shifted to the
resistance that preceded this transition. 
The documents that all these people gave me mainly contain information
about the opposition of the inhabitants to the process of expulsion and to
the resettlement of the inhabitants of the island, which allowed me to re-
construct a large number of events that took place between the late 1990s
and 2012.
I also downloaded 134 reports of Subdistrict Offices (jiedao banshichu),
in the Haizhu district, and the city of Guangzhou from the websites of these
agencies, and consulted local administrative records (difang zhi), (37) enabling
me to reconstruct the geographical and administrative context of the dis-
placement of the village. Due to the number of actions that took place si-
multaneously among the various population groups living on the island, and
the lack of data on entry into the new blocks of flats, I have used as a main
theme the resistance of the peasants that preceded the urban transition
they experienced, and I will only occasionally refer to the other inhabitants
of the island.
Case study: An inevitable expulsion
The institutional preliminaries to the expulsion of
the villagers
Until 2002, the island of Xiaodao was under the direction of two admin-
istrations: the urban district of Haizhu, which managed the urban popula-
tion, and the township of Xinjiao, which managed the rural population. The
township of Xinjiao thus supervised fifty “natural” villages, but with the ur-
banisation of the territory, the border between the rural and urban areas
faded, causing tension between the two administrations. To address these
problems, the municipal authorities decided in March 2002 to abolish the
borough of Xinjiao. The 64,879 inhabitants of the villages concerned then
lost their rural hukou, which were changed into non-rural hukou, and
44 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 3 / 1
36. Many cases of physical threats and even violent crackdowns on outside observers of expropriations
have appeared in the press. See for example: AFP, “Chine: deux journalistes étrangers malmenés
dans un village” (China: Two foreign journalists mangled in a village), 7 October 2005.
37. These can be consulted at the University Science Centre of the Chinese University in Hong Kong.
Special feature
Table 1 – Number and types of documents collected in regard to the relations 
between the local authorities and the four categories of population living on the island.
Village inhabitants
(holding 




hukou: 62 plaintiffs out
of 351 worker families)
Landowners who came 




(out of 60 people, 
only one couple who
lost its two houses)
Inhabitants’ complaints
sent to the government 5 4 2 4
Answers from 
the government 4 3 2 2
Letters from the authori-
ties to the inhabitants 5 9 3 2
Legal cases 2 – 6 4
146 Residents’ Committees were created under the supervision of the Sub-
district Offices of the district of Haizhu, including the village of Xiaodao.
Along with this change of hukou, an “Ecological Park” project was filed in
2000 by the Haizhu District with the city of Guangzhou, without the knowl-
edge of the villagers. The residents say they suspected nothing at the time.
In fact, the village’s tree plantations were part of the district’s “10,000 Fruit
Tree Park,” which gave the villagers the feeling of being safe from requisi-
tions. In 2012, a certain Huang had this to say on the subject: 
How could we understand the implications of these changes? [...] We
had kept our plots of farmland. In addition, at the time young people
like me were working outside the village. With the change of hukou
we could at last be hired like city dwellers and contribute to our re-
tirement pensions.
Moreover, the old village committees were maintained alongside the new
Residents’ Committees to ensure the transition of powers between the ad-
ministrative structures of the village. In other words, the expropriation de-
cision had been taken but not yet announced to the villagers, probably
because it had not been approved administratively.
According to the documents I consulted, the administrative process to ob-
tain authorisation for the requisitions began with requests to the Ministry
of Land Management to build an ecological park and to nationalise the land,
and lasted until 2004, when the requisitions were implemented. It was then
that the authorities of the new Subdistrict office informed the “villagers” (38)
that the land was to be requisitioned.
The village chief, elected in 2002 for a period of three years, then submit-
ted his resignation according to testimony. The authorities of the district
appointed a temporary leader from among the village committee members
to ensure the end of the term, and normal village life resumed. Internal re-
ports indicate that cadres from senior administrative levels came to present
to the population of the island measures taken to facilitate employment
assistance after relocation, (39) while local officials received training to pre-
pare them for the requisitions. The leadership of the village thus changed
smoothly while propaganda work began surreptitiously.
Once the requisition program was put in place, (40) a “task force” (gongzuo
zu) moved into the empty fish factory at a distance from the village. Nobody
really knew who had sent it, but it seems that it oversaw the practical man-
agement of the requisitions, giving orders to the village committee. (41) Shortly
after the arrival of the team, a symbolic change occurred: the interim leader
of the village, the local secretary of the Communist Party and the cadres in
charge of family planning set up their offices in the ancestral temple of the
Huang clan. All the players in the relocation were then in place, ready to deal
with the reactions of the people subject to requisitions. Moreover, the vil-
lagers were ordered to stop cultivating the land, which was no longer des-
tined for agricultural use but for urban economic projects. Then came the
announcement of the requisition, and the beginning of the interactions that
would pit the category of local villagers against the local authorities.
Limiting the sphere of action
In October 2005, two months after the arrival of the Task Force, new elec-
tions were held in the village, but only the former members of the village
committee were allowed to present themselves, and members of the secu-
rity forces intimidated the village representatives, (42) designating the “pre-
selected” candidate. On polling day, in front of all the villagers, policemen
filmed the ballot papers as they were put into the ballot box. Some villagers
decided to boycott the elections for fear of reprisals, which allowed the can-
didate supported by the authorities to be elected as the result of what was
presented as a legitimate process.
Yuanfei Huang recalls: “I did not want to play their game, but neither could
I take the risk of going to jail by voting for the person I supported, so I did
not go to vote.”
In November 2005, the government and the new leadership of the village
signed an agreement on Xiaodao Island compensation and scheduled the
requisition of the fields for the following month. Also, it was now forbidden
for more than five people to meet together in the village. (43) Several villagers
protesting in groups were then arrested for criminal association. (44) Finally,
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ceeded with the idea of creating an “international ecological island,” using developers able to in-
vest in construction projects on the island.
41. Official documents highlight the regular visit to Xiaodao Island of the officials of the surrounding
villages, employees of the local branch of the Party, and employees from different municipal serv-
ices. Some cadres were probably dispatched from their original administrations to join the Task
Force that lived on the island.
42. According to a villager, the “representatives of the people” (renmin daibiao) are elected by the
villagers. They occupy an intermediate function between the village chief and the “masses,” and
they can participate in local meetings and make known the views of other villagers without being
officials. Cf. Sylvia Chan, “Villagers’ Representative Assemblies: Towards Democracy or Centralism?”,
China: An International Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2003, pp. 179-199.
43. According to several internal documents, such as the “Note from the Guangzhou government
about the progress and implementation of the work of requisition, destruction, and vacation of
the Guangzhou International Ecological Island” published in September 2008, this decision is
based on the “Criminal Law for the Management of Public Security of the PRC” (Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo zhi’an guanli chengfachu) enacted in 2005.
44. I have not gathered any written evidence on this point, but two witness accounts converge. How-
ever, by virtue of the document mentioned in footnote 42, paragraph 4: “In the period of land
requisition and destruction, each of the acts listed below shall be reprimanded [...] by the author-
ities concerned: disturbing the work of national authorities in carrying out their responsibilities;
disturbing the normal progress of requisition of land and works; spreading rumours and confusion
and generating conflicts; provoking fights in a group, looking for quarrels and deliberately causing
disturbances to public order; stealing, plundering, or destroying public and private property.”
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A meeting in the temple
© All rights reserved, photograph given by a local resident.
the villagers helplessly witnessed the uprooting of their fruit trees in De-
cember 2005. Only one old lady tried to intervene, but she was beaten and
sent to the hospital. Villagers then warned her son not to go to the hospital,
because he was wanted for protesting publicly against the authorities and
risked arrest if he went there.
A report from the district to the municipality states:
Thanks to the coordination of activities between the local authorities,
the central territorial development centre, and the departments con-
cerned, the major difficulties have been overcome. Thanks to all types
of effective measures that have been adopted and through propa-
ganda and public discussions, 100 percent of the villagers have signed
their requisition and agricultural land development agreements. (45)
Thus the authorities managed to get the signed agreement of residents
while avoiding disturbances to public order.
Monitoring of the Office of Letters and Visits
Following these events, many villagers sent complaints to the Office of
Letters and Visits (46) of the district and the municipality. The plaintiffs re-
ceived the first official responses confirming that a review of the files
found that the land requisitions in Xiaodao were carried out in accordance
with national regulations. The people then tried to use several Offices of
Letters and Visits at the municipal and regional levels, (47) but the author-
ities dismissed the requests or referred the files to the lower levels on the
grounds that the request was not their responsibility, and were slow to
respond.
Some of the inhabitants realised that their complaints would not lead to
a satisfactory conclusion and decided to raise money to send a group of
complainants to the Office of Letters and Visits in Beijing, hoping to make
their case to the head office of the administration, free from the corruption
of the local authorities. When they got off the train, the plaintiffs were met
by village cadres and Guangdong police. After two days of interrogation,
they were sent back to village. (48)
The people most committed or able to take a stand were progressively
isolated, while others became afraid or simply did not know how to pursue
resistance any further. One of them commented: “We were confronted with
eviction professionals who had already displaced and destroyed dozens of
villages around us.” 
Meanwhile, the propaganda work in the village continued, with public
meetings where the expulsions were presented as a necessary step for the
improvement of living conditions. Thus began a period of transition. The in-
habitants, deprived of their agricultural land, all had to seek sources of in-
come outside the village. Some people even found work thanks to measures
implemented by the authorities of the district. Only a minority was then
financially able and willing to take the risk of becoming actively involved in
the resistance. However, most people circumvented the prohibition on cul-
tivating farmland by cultivating for their own consumption any land by the
roadside or outside the buildings that had not been previously recorded as
“agricultural land.” Despite the apparent calm after the failure of the col-
lective complaints and the ensuing arrests, some of the inhabitants sought
to show in this way that they were symbolically united against the author-
ities. (49)
Monitoring of the legal route
In the course of 2006, work on the tunnel began and the authorities de-
molished two houses belonging a Huaqiao couple who had invested in the
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45. See “Xiaodaodao nongyongdi Shunli yijiao” (Xiaodao Island farmlands successfully transferred),
Report of the Bureau of Land Management and Housing of Haizhu District, 6 December 2005.
46. All government authorities and the CCP are supposed to have an office of Letters and Visits (whose
central office is located in Beijing), where people can report grievances, injustices, etc., to higher
authorities without going through the legal route. The rule is that the complaints are written at
the local level and then progress up the levels to the higher authorities when claims are rejected.
Complainants then feel compelled to go to the offices to press their demands. To limit the extent
of group visits, regulations limit to five the number of spokespeople who are actually received.
See the work of Isabelle Thireau et al., Les ruses de la démocratie, op. cit. The articles by Lianjiang
Li, “Political Trust and Petitioning in the Chinese Countryside,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 40, No. 2,
2008, pp. 209-226; and Ying Xing, “Les ‘visites’ collectives des paysans auprès des autorités
supérieures” (The collective ‘visits’ of peasants to superior authorities), Études rurales, No. 179,
2007, pp. 155-168 also describe some of the points mentioned.
47. They addressed such a letter to the municipal land management and housing administration. But
they did not know then that this administration was responsible for “overseeing the work of req-
uisitions in times of tension, of heavy responsibilities, of complication of situations related to
land, and other situations where some villagers have not understood the situation,”“Summary of
meeting with the Mayor of Guangzhou,” 5 September 2007.
48. Several accounts are confirmed by more recent complaints, which also denounce this episode.
49. On everyday practices as a source of freedom, cf. Michel de Certeau, L’invention du quotidien.
Tome 1: Arts de faire (The invention of daily life. Volume 1: The Arts de Faire), Gallimard, 1990;
Marc Bessin et al., “Les armes du faible sont-elles de faibles armes?” (Are the weapons of the weak
weak weapons?), L’Homme et la société, No. 143-144, 2002, pp. 3-11.
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construction of the school, and a six-storey building belonging to
Huang Changliang, a representative of the villagers who had started invest-
ing in real estate on the island. Seeing the failure of collective grievances,
the three owners decided, separately, to resort to the services of two firms
of lawyers in Beijing in order to sue. 
Counsel for the villager filed a complaint against the district authorities for
the destruction of his client’s house, but he added a second charge that called
into question the requisition of the village’s collective land. He stated that
the villagers cultivated a total area of more than 2,000 mu (50) and denounced
the calculation of compensation on the basis of 72 mu of “agricultural land,”
while the rest of the collective lands managed by the village committee were
transformed into natural non-agricultural land, namely 269 mu of “forest”
and 1490 mu of “park,” which are part of the “10,000 Fruit Tree Park” of the
district. Agricultural lands are better compensated than parks and forests,
because they are a means of survival for the villagers.
Huang Changliang’s father-in-law, who is almost 70, furiously recounts:
Originally, the 2,000 mu of agricultural land were used for food crops.
I was the first inhabitant to plant fruit trees in the 1980s, to enable
my sons to go and work in the city. Then all the peasants in the village
did the same, and now people dare to say that the village had only
a few mu of agricultural land, which in reality corresponded to the
only vegetable plots remaining on the island in 2004.
According to the arguments put forward by the lawyer, however, this de-
crease in surface area was mainly a means for the authorities to circumvent
the law on the preservation of agricultural land at local level. (51) They thus
accuse the local authorities of “by-passing the law by cheating on the
amount of agricultural land and usurping the name of the government to
intimidate the villagers.” (52) On 25 March 2007, the lawyer, who had gone
down to Guangzhou to plead the villagers’ case, was reported missing. Ac-
cording to some villagers, he was kidnapped by the local authorities. Two
days later, he reappeared, having been sentenced to a year in prison for il-
legally consorting with a prostitute in his hotel room. (53) The villager who
had hired the lawyer was not arrested, but lacking a lawyer, the lawsuit
against the district authorities was dropped. (54)
As for the two lawsuits brought by the Huaqiao couple after several ap-
peals, the High Court of the Guangzhou area in 2010 recognised a procedural
defect and requested a retrial, but in 2012 this had still not taken place. In-
stead of direct repression against the Huaqiao, the authorities seemed to be
delaying the trial in order to avoid discussion. However, their lawyer, who
had meanwhile agreed to defend other villagers, stated that he had received
threats from various authorities for disorderly conduct in public. (55)
The manipulation of an incident
Three days before the arrest of the lawyer, a truck on the tunnel project
passed perilously close to a villager. There followed an altercation between
the driver and nine villagers who were present at the scene. Construction
workers then arrived, equipped with metal bars. Several farmers were in-
jured, two men remained in a coma for several months (including
Huang Changliang’s father-in-law), and a third person died of his injuries.
In addition, four villagers involved in the fight, including Huang Changliang’s
brother-in-law, were arrested for disturbing public order. They were sen-
tenced to over a year in a re-education work camp, where they were re-
portedly denied any visitors. (56) Moreover, there is no evidence that the
workers who beat them with metal bars were arrested and tried.
Shortly after the incident, the authorities offered to release the four pris-
oners in exchange for signing the relocation agreement. In addition, they
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50. A mu is equivalent to 666.7 square meters.
51. According to He Bochuan: “On 1 July 2002, in order to slow the pace of requisitions, the Ministry
of Land and Resources ordered that as from 1 July 2003, any project involving building land would
have to pass through a system of advertisements, tenders, and auctions. [...] The result, for 2002
on a national level, was over 140,000 violations of the law, or 50.5 percent more than in 2001.
And in 2003, [...] there were 168,000 illegal cases, concentrated mainly in the first six months of
the year.” “La crise agraire en Chine. Données et réflexions,” op. cit., p. 123.
52. The villagers include these terms in several complaints, such as the one entitled “Jiujiu women!”
(“Save us!”) addressed to “The Respectable Discipline Committee of the CPC,” 21 February 2009.
53. Information confirmed by the website “Weiquan wang,” cf. “The lawyer who helped farmers on
the Island Xiaodao in Guangzhou to defend their rights was denounced and arrested for frequent-
ing prostitutes” (Xiezhu Guangzhou Xiaodao cunmin weiquan lushi bei zhi dangju piaochang Juliu),
18 July 2007 (missing web page, last accessed in May 2010).
54. There appears to be no evidence confirming the amount of agricultural land previously held, but
the inhabitants have a 1998 document that planned the preservation on the Xiaodao Island of
475 mu of farmland, proving that the figure of 72 mu was well below the reality.
55. “The inhabitants of Xiaodao refuse at all costs to sacrifice their ancestral temple. Some denounce
the control of the official lawyer,” 6 January 2009. Weiquan wang website (missing page, last ac-
cessed on May 2010).
56. I met two people who had spent more than a year in jail, but they remained silent on the type of
prison where they had been, preferring to let the other people in the room speak for them. Only one
person said about their incarceration: “Even the prison guards had pity on us. They knew that we weren’t
criminals, and that we had nothing to be ashamed of. We were more free in prison than on our island.”
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offered 900,000 yuan in compensation to the family of the deceased. But
the father refused the money as an attempt at a cover-up, and tried to com-
mit suicide by swallowing fertiliser. The peasants found him unconscious
and saved his life, but “this did not awaken the authorities,” as they wrote
in several complaints made to local authorities. They denounced the black-
mail attempts and demanded that “the truth be rectified” about the arrests
and the death. Local authorities then responded, as in this letter from the
Xiaodao Subdistrict office sent in April 2009, two years after the events:
[...] A member of the Xiaodao Economic Union, due to a heart prob-
lem, had a sudden heart attack resulting in his death (according to
the medical diagnosis that the Department of Medicine at Sun Yat-
sen University agreed to carry out especially for this case). (57) Those
involved in the fight who committed illegal acts have been repri-
manded by the law. There is therefore no connection between the
death of this villager and the work of land requisition.
However, this episode reinforced the shared sense of injustice among the vil-
lagers. Sixty of them tried a few weeks later to go to Beijing, travelling in several
groups in order not to be noticed, but they were arrested, some spent a year in
jail, and their names were added to a blacklist. (58) It is unclear whether the fight
was provoked or if it was just a combination of circumstances, but the exploita-
tion of this incident helped radicalise the repression against the villagers.
The relocation approaches
A few months later, in January 2008, a “Notice of Relocation” was posted
in the village. Two hundred sixty-four villagers signed a request for a collec-
tive audience. Only five representatives of the villagers were allowed to ex-
press themselves and 27 people were able attend but could not speak. Thir-
teen members of the government and two journalists listened to what they
had to say. The farmers asked in particular to see the documents proving
the validity of the requisitions and the methods of calculating compensa-
tion. The cadres present stated that the change of hukou, which took place
in 2002, does not provide for the transformation of rights to use buildable
land in the country into ownership rights, (59) which are reserved for the
urban market. The houses, even those more than 300 years old, were con-
sidered “illegal” and must be destroyed.
In April 2008, as the draw for the allocation of new housing approached,
another document was posted in the village:
Letter to the residents of Xiaodao (60)
From 25 to 28 March 2008 there will be a ceremony to distribute
new housing on the International Ecological Island of Xiaodao. [...]
700 lots will be redistributed with joy. [...] Those who have already
accepted compensation for the loss of their homes are worthy men
who by their actions support the construction of the nation. [...] May
they serve as models for the other residents. [...]
Residents of Xiaodao [...] must apply in time to take advantage of
discounts offered by the Party. This is a practical approach to defend
the interests of the masses. [...] That is why Humanism is at the heart
of the government’s concerns. [...]
Those who do not sign in time will not benefit from the reduced rate
of 850 yuan per sqm for the purchase of their new apartment, or the
20,000 yuan reward for a departure in time; likewise they will not be
able to choose the orientation or which floor their apartment will be
on. That will be determined by the draw. [...]
No law and no state can sit idly by in the face of harmful acts. We
advise those people [who spread all kinds of rumours] to stop before
it is too late! [...]
For those who have not yet signed the compensation agreements:
We expect you to cooperate and hope to come into this new era
hand-in-hand with you. [...]
- The team of engineers to promote the International Ecological Is-
land of Xiaodao. [Tuijin xiadao guoji shengwudao gongcheng
gongzuodui]
- Subdistrict Office of The People’s Government of Haizhu District
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57. According to the authorities, the hospital of Sun Yat-sen University carried out analysis of the
death without an autopsy. It seems that the first violent demonstrations in the village of Wukan,
in the Guangzhou area, also started after the death in custody of a representative of the village,
which has been presented as a heart attack by the same hospital, more than 300 kilometres from
Wukan. See iSunAffairs, op. cit.
58. Several people mentioned this list, saying it is transferred to a national electronic file that prevents
them from buying plane and train tickets, and makes it possible to follow them whenever their
identification is recorded in a centralised system. One of them was arrested one day on the way
to a hotel, because the police received an automatic signal indicating the presence in the city of
a blacklisted person. They interrogated him for several hours, thinking he was a criminal. When
they got to the police station, they realised that there was a phone number included in the file.
It was that of the “Task Force” to be contacted when a person went to Beijing to bring a grievance.
Laughing, this person told me that the police then exclaimed: “Oh! Is that all?”, and gave him ad-
mission to a foot massage parlour, where he was able to spend the night.
59. On this point cf. Wang Hansheng and Shen Jing, “La formation des droits de propriété dans les
campagnes chinoises” (The creation of property rights in the Chinese countryside), Études rurales,
No. 179, 2007, pp. 193-212.
60. Excerpts translated by the author.
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Those residents most involved in the fight against the requisitions who
had not been imprisoned understood that they were directly threatened.
Those who could not resign themselves to signing then took flight. (61)
Having to go into hiding, they tried to alert the media at a distance on
the situation in the village. Changliang recounts that an English journalist
with the BBC had agreed to investigate, but he was met on the island by
plainclothes police with fluent English, who forced him to leave. Several ar-
ticles touting the merits of the proposed Ecological Island and the improve-
ment of the living conditions of peasants were published, but only a single
Chinese journalist published an article that the villagers would consider to
be “objective.” (62) During my last visit, a villager let slip: “Now that you’re a
friend, we can tell you that we paid the journalist over 20,000 yuan in ex-
change for his investigation.” (63) The article served as evidence that they
cited in a large number of complaints, but in 2012 they admitted that the
article had had no real impact in their attempts at resistance.
In May 2008, a month after the “Letter to the inhabitants of Xiaodao,”
a new dramatic event occurred: residents learned that they would not be
able to take part in the Duanwujie Festival, during which the Dragon Boat
festivities take place. During these celebrations, men go for days at a time
to the “brother villages” in the area, which are often members of the same
clan, to maintain the ancestral ties between villages. (64) Xiaodao residents
had two boats, one of which was said to be a hundred years old, and a
third clan boat reserved for Chinese emigrants who return to the village
for the ceremonies. However, a few days after the ban on participation in
festivals, residents found the three Dragon Boats destroyed. The villagers
suspected the Task Force of having committed this offense, but no perpe-
trator or witness of the destruction of boats could be found. According to
one resident:
Our village had qualified to compete in a dragon boat race at the
municipal level. They destroyed the dragon boats for fear that we
might seize this opportunity to display banners in front of the cam-
eras and the public.
Without a boat, they were excluded from the competition without the
authorities having to justify a ban on competing. The authorities thus
showed an ability to use timely means of repression for each situation while
striking at the identity of the village community. Some people even say they
thought at the time that “they wanted to erase the name of Xiaodao.”
A “successful” relocation 
In the course of 2008, the authorities obtained agreement to relocate the
majority of the residents, and the collective move took place in October. (65)
The village authorities also left the island and moved into their new offices
in one of the two blocks of flats. A hundred people who refused to sign the
agreement then stormed the temple of the ancestors, in which they took
refuge, but they could not prevent the authorities from demolishing their
homes. They lived without electricity for several weeks. Monitored in their
every move outside the island, those who worked in the city saw pressure
brought to bear on their employers. (66)
In the year following the eviction, the majority of the resisters gave up
the siege on the island; some signed the eviction agreement, while others
preferred to rent in the city in order to continue their resistance at a dis-
tance. There were only 20 people left in the ruins of the village. Moreover,
the villagers in prison were released, and those who had fled were able to
return, since the destruction of the village was complete.
Six months after the move, the Xiaodao cadres were commended for con-
ducting the operation calmly. The inhabitants had all received their owner-
ship documents, marking the transition to modernity through access to
private property. A ceremony was organised for the occasion. A meeting was
held between the cadres of the Residents’ Committee and the military of
the district, after which they spelled out the “lessons from the experience
of the eviction of Xiaodao” marking “the end of the river crossing.” (67)
Complaints thus remained geographically limited to the surroundings of
the island of Xiaodao. No more than a few complaints were able to reach
up as far as the municipal and regional governments, but the relocation of
the village was carried out without any public excesses or any effective
media coverage of the struggle. 
Revolts without social movement
The authorities in charge of moving the village compensated the islanders
differently according to their category (urban dwellers, former farmers,
Huaqiao), which resulted in different patterns of complaints and modes of
resistance. Repressive measures were then adapted to each category of peo-
ple. Thus, on the island itself, the struggle against expropriation was divided
between the different categories of people, as if the expropriations were
being carried out in different places and for different reasons.
Moreover, we have seen that repression intensified during the periods of
requisition of collective property, first of the land, then of the village, while
it was more diffuse at times when the struggle was restricted to specific in-
terests, as in the case of the last resisters once the collective relocation was
completed. This was also the case of the workers who fought only for the
defence of their homes, to which they held an urban title, and not against
the closure of the factory or against the “Ecological Island” project. In return
they were not subjected to any physical violence.
It is difficult to see how this resistance, however intense, could form a so-
cial movement, as it was not even coordinated among the inhabitants of
the island. (68) Most complaints were attempts to renegotiate the compen-
sation provided by the authorities, but almost no resident questioned the
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61. Changliang then left to work for an NGO based in Hong Kong, which helps the education of poor
children in rural areas, and did not return to Xiaodao until a year later, once the eviction was com-
plete.
62. “Guangzhou guoji shengwudao bei zhi manbao qianmu gengdi” (Xiaodao International Ecological
Island criticised for concealing more than 1000 mu of farmland) Huaxia shibao (China Times),
10 May 2008, p. 5.
63. This earned him a vociferous telling-off in Cantonese.
64. The Dragon Boat festivals were banned during the Cultural Revolution. On the history of dragon
boat racing, cf. Andrew Chittick, “The Song Navy and the Invention of Dragon Boat Racing,” Journal
of Song-Yuan Studies, Vol. 41, 2011, pp. 1-28. On the observation of tensions on the ground around
these festivals, cf. Boris Svartzman, “Cérémonies de Bateaux-Dragons” (Dragon boat ceremonies),
Carnets du Centre Chine, June 2012, http://cecmc.hypotheses.org/?p=6952 (consulted on 26 Oc-
tober 2012).
65. Residents had to pay for the moving trucks that were made available to them. 
66. For example, one of the resisters, who had to travel in the course of his work, told how members
of the public security apparatus asked his boss to deprive him of his company car, as it was be-
coming too complicated to follow it. Acts of vandalism then took place at night in the premises,
which came to an end when he chose to leave his job. 
67. Report of the Subdistrict Office, 26 December 2012.
68. According to Chen Yingfang, “Expecting to see the emergence of a political movement to change
the system, based on the expectations and demands for housing of the displaced, does not cor-
respond to the reality of civil society”; “Légitimité, rationalité et stratégies politiques: les fonde-
ments du ‘miracle urbain chinois’” (Legitimacy, rationality and political strategies: The roots of
the “Chinese urban miracle”), Terrains & travaux, No. 16, 2009, p. 132.
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proposed expulsion in written complaints. The only villager who filed a law-
suit on this question (with the help of a lawyer) opposed the requisition of
collective village land without questioning the expulsion of other categories
of people. The authorities thus managed to transform the opposition of the
inhabitants of the island into an accumulation of resistances related to so-
cial and individual categories, which only marginally disrupted the social
order of the island. The Office of Letters and Visits played the part of pro-
viding an outlet through which dissatisfaction could be legitimately ex-
pressed, but never turned into a space for legitimate complaints against the
government.
Residents understood, however, that the only hope of getting the atten-
tion of the authorities was to remain united in order to produce a mass
effect (so that complaints did not come from isolated agitators, but from
the group as a whole). However, at no time did the various categories of
inhabitants unite against the proposed Ecological Island. This division of
the population thus became the frame of reference, respected by the peo-
ple, in which actions were to take place. (69) Resistance thus seemed to be
limited by the authorities both geographically and in the form it took.
While occupations of public or private spaces (sit-ins) are generally ef-
fective means of pressure on the authorities, (70) here they were the result
of a struggle constrained by the legal framework. The authorities were
able to impose on the inhabitants committed to resisting the requisitions
a mode of action, holding out in their own homes, which was not neces-
sarily the one that people would have chosen if other forms of pressure
were not severely punished. This is perhaps the central feature of the
crackdown, which was not to eliminate dissenting voices, but to confine
them in spaces that allowed the expression of complaints (by sending
complaints or sitting-in in one’s own house) while preventing the struggle
from transcending the private sphere. Despite collective dissatisfaction,
resistance was reduced to a personal commitment, deprived of any public
action. 
Those who then tried to negotiate and enter into the process of writing
grievances faced a crucial choice: either to attack the project supported
by the local government directly – but they must bear the consequences
of the repressive machinery – or to express their dissatisfaction without
calling the relocation into question. Faced with this second type of com-
plaint, the local authorities adopted an attitude of partnership in which
dialogue is possible, while trying to gain acceptance of the public interest.
Although consent was obtained by methods that cast doubt on the le-
gitimacy of the authorities, the latter cannot be said to have acted ille-
gally, and any future complaint is theoretically defused. The highlight of
the requisition was therefore not based on mere repression by the gov-
ernment against the resistance movement, but rather on the strategy of
leading all the inhabitants to sign the original agreement. Objections to
evictions in China do not therefore call the government into question;
they fit into the process of urbanisation as an element that is now part
of the system.
In our view, the case of Xiaodao is revelatory of the methods used in a
large number of forced requisitions in China, both in the city and in the
country. (71) A number of tensions related to expropriations are relayed,
especially in the Chinese social media and the international press. Indeed,
because of the violence by the authorities against groups of individuals
who resist at all costs against their expulsion, the particularly virulent
demonstrations produced are then often raised by outside observers to
the level of a growing (72) social movement that reflects a desire of the
Chinese people for empowerment in the face of local cadres. (73) But most
of the resistances are isolated from each other because of their local na-
ture, thus making repression of these demonstrations easier. The publi-
cised cases constitute exceptions in light of the millions of people evicted
every year whose resistances are ignored. In addition, people who engage
in the defence of townspeople and farmers facing eviction are usually
arbitrarily arrested. (74) Although there is awareness at the national level
of the seriousness of the evictions, the accumulation of resistance to ex-
propriation does not make a social movement.
However, there exists a context of social protest that could at any time
form the basis for a social movement. First of all, the formal approval of the
people who signed the expropriation agreement does not prove that the
tensions are resolved permanently. To return to the case of Xiaodao, for ex-
ample, we observed the emergence of new complaints in the blocks of flats,
which show that the dissolution of the village community did not resolve
the feeling of injustice, even four years after the relocation.
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69. Zhang Lun writes: “Unlike in many Eastern European countries, reform is initiated and promoted
by the ruling elites. Going beyond the existing legitimate framework is unimaginable at the outset,
and remains difficult thereafter”; “Changement social et mouvements sociaux” (Social change
and social movements), Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, No. 122, 2007, p. 11.
70. Susana Bleil, op. cit.; Frédéric Vairel, “L’ordre disputé du sit-in au Maroc” (The disputed order of
sit-in in Marocco), Genèses, No. 59, 2005, pp. 47-70; Étienne Penissat, “Les occupations de locaux
dans les années 1960-1970: processus sociohistoriques de “réinvention” d’un mode d’action” (Oc-
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Initial adaptation to the urban environment
The urban transition of Xiaodao Village began with the change of hukou
in 2002, and ended six years later with the move into the apartment blocks,
concluding several years of collective resistance. However, 40 people have
not signed the eviction agreement, including 20 who still live on the island,
amid the ruins of the village, in the houses of the Huaqiao hidden by fences,
and some of the population living in the new housing is engaged in new
demands.
Symbolic resistance
After an unsuccessful first attempt at immersion in the apartment blocks
in 2009, I was able to witness moments of community life through the re-
sumption of the Dragon Boat festivals in 2011 and 2012. After the suspen-
sion of festivals since the destruction of the boats in the village in 2008,
the new committee of Xiaodao residents made a gift of two new boats in
2011 (with a capacity of 80 people each) to the former inhabitants of the
village. On the day when the Brother Villages were invited, the Residents’
Committee also organised a meal for more than 1,000 people in front of
the apartment blocks, where ceremonies are now held. According to some
witnesses, a hundred cadres and police attended, sitting at tables that had
been set up on the parking lot of the residence.
While these festivals were the subject of growing interest on the part of
the inhabitants of the region, who packed the banks of the river to see the
rowers pass, three groups of people opposed to manipulation by the au-
thorities of their traditional festival then clubbed together to buy their own
Dragon Boats (with a capacity of 40 people) and held, in the ruins of the
village, in the temple of the ancestors of the Huang clan, their welcoming
ceremony for the Brother Villages “as is traditional.” (75) The Subdistrict au-
thorities allowed the festivities to happen simultaneously in two places, al-
though the inhabitants saw it as an act of resistance. One of them even
said to me in a joking tone: “We can say that we are a splinter party.”
However, residents living on the island were ordered not to let me attend
the festivities, citing security reasons, and many of my interlocutors were
questioned on this occasion by the police on the reasons for my presence.
In 2012, I was also forbidden access to the training that preceded the fes-
tivals even though it was taking place on boats purchased by individuals.
One of the residents, upset about this, told me: “They say that the village
cannot be responsible if you have an accident, but they are our boats. Yet
nobody prevents us from having you as a passenger in our cars even if you
risk an accident.”
But other villagers saw that the authorities feared that my presence might
allow the divulging not only of the presence of the last households that re-
sisted eviction, but also of the new complaints emerging. One said to me
discreetly: “You must understand that some people cannot sleep at night
while you’re here.”
In fact, I met a resident working in another city (76) who told me that he
returned to Xiaodao during the Dragon Boat Festival in order to show other
people that resistance could continue even if the village had been destroyed:
“It’s like boat races: we must be united to move the Dragon Boat, and the
more our movements are coordinated, the faster the boat moves.”
An enduring feeling of injustice
Some people have decided to start carrying grievances to higher author-
ities because they feel they have been cheated on the value of their houses
on the island, and are deeply dissatisfied since their relocation. In addition,
residents have returned to mass demonstrations, to demand a new election
within the Residents’ Committee, as well as control of the new economic
and political structures of the “village.” Indeed, despite the status change
from rural residents to urban residents, Xiaodao inhabitants did not gain ac-
cess to the social services reserved for urban residents, which further exac-
erbated the sense of injustice linked to their relocation.
To compensate for the loss of agricultural land, which was collectively
owned, farmers received compensation high enough to finance the purchase
of approximately one apartment per family. However, the village commit-
tee, which managed the collective land, was also granted compensation
that was used to purchase land in the city for land transactions, primarily
leasehold. In order to maintain a collective management structure for the
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75. Cao Dan also shows the importance of the Dragon Boats in village culture, and how people use
the opportunity of this event to return to their native place. Cf. Dragon Boat, op. cit.
76. This resident has not signed the eviction agreement. He stays with his sister in Xiaodao because
he is on the blacklist and has already been arrested when registering at a hotel. He called a friend
who owns a car with tinted windows to take me discreetly to a restaurant where we could talk,
away from the block of flats. 
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new land, the “Xiaodao Rural Cooperative” was formally changed to the “Xi-
aodao Economic Union” (Xiaodao lianheshe), managed as a corporation
whose profits are paid to shareholders. (77) In 2002, the date of the change
of hukou, every adult villager received a share, and people over 60 received
two shares.
According to testimony, the other villages in the area also saw the creation
of Economic Unions, and the rule was that they would manage a land area
of about 10 to 15 percent of the land formerly owned by the village. (78) The
Xiaodao Economic Union acquired four lots with an area equivalent to ap-
proximately 10 percent of the land formerly owned by the village commit-
tee (about 200 mu, including 20 mu of land that was granted on the island
of Xiaodao). But only one site was being exploited in 2012, bringing in 250
yuan per share. Although agriculture was unprofitable from a financial point
of view, it was an integral part of the domestic economy as an independ-
ently managed safety net. In contrast, the new organisation of collective
land makes land management opaque, and people have no idea of the ac-
tual returns.
Moreover, the authorities established access to a minimum pension for
villagers over 60, and have set lower contributions for people over 45 so
they can contribute more easily for the 15 years required, but younger res-
idents must find a job in order to contribute. In addition, a large number of
them have worked in the city since the 1980s without being able to con-
tribute to social benefits. (79) A resident who is approaching 50 comments:
I worked for over 20 years in the city. Now that I have trouble finding
a steady job, because it’s becoming more difficult to deal with the
competition of young migrants who accept low wages, I no longer
have any land to survive on, because of the expropriation!
Thus, despite the change of hukou, only a small number of the inhabitants
of Xiaodao have access to social protection, (80) while they all have a – min-
imal – income from the new “collectively” managed land, which is not avail-
able to residents in the same neighbourhood who were not members of the
former village committee.
However, voices are beginning to be heard requesting the funding of pen-
sion contributions for all the residents and democratic elections for the res-
idents of Xiaodao, which have been suspended since the last elections in
2005 after the resignation of the chief of the village (local elections are
supposed to take place every three years). But the Subdistrict Office re-
sponded that because of “the administrative work necessary to complete
the transition from a rural to an urban system,” (81) the higher authorities
have authorised the suspension of elections. Moreover, they claim to have
established a system of “control over finances, public affairs, and govern-
ment affairs. Violations of the law and regulations that are discovered during
the screening process will undergo legal examination [...], the residents who
signed the requisition, destruction, and relocation agreement therefore have
no reason to complain.” (82)
Some people then took an even greater part in the collective grievances,
and demonstrated not only in front of the offices of the Residents’ Com-
mittee, but also of the District and the city of Guangdong, where they did
not hesitate to confront government cadres. (83)
In other words, the tensions that emerged were intimately linked to the
former management framework of the rural community, despite the disman-
tling of the administration put in place in the early days of the communist
regime. In addition, the new administrative structures, which symbolise ac-
cess to a capitalist economy, are in fact also forced to adapt to the new forms
of urban organisation they themselves have brought about.
This situation illustrates the blurred territory that persists in the distinction
between collective interests inherited from the former village cooperatives
and the stranglehold of the state on the national development of a capital-
ist-style economy. An inhabitant explains his experience: “Now that our
hukou is ‘non-rural,’ we are neither rural nor urban. What is our identity, ex-
actly?” Although he seems not to know that the term urban hukou does
not exist, (84) he reveals what he really thinks: “We are not like other urban
dwellers.” From this gap is emerging a new urban class looking for bench-
marks and increasingly demanding its rights.
The commitment of these residents, ready to defend their interests despite
the repression they suffered before the eviction, makes it possible to un-
derstand why the authorities maintain such control over the residents in
the blocks of flats after their move into the buildings. The intensity of these
tensions, rather than being opposition to the regime, is now part of the very
process of relocation and adjustment of villagers to urban settings, which
the authorities cannot deny. It is difficult to predict the direction events will
take, when and how the remaining inhabitants who are holding out on the
island will be expelled, whether the income from other development land
will suffice to meet the demands of new residents, if the residents will man-
age to elect one of their own who will defend their interests, etc. What is
certain, however, is that all these events will be revelatory of the political
context in China. As one resident put it: “Xiaodao, is not the whole of China,
but everywhere in China there are the same problems as in Xiaodao.”
The displacement of Xiaodao villagers into new apartment blocks gives
us a fairly accurate picture of the movement of a village, but also of how
resistance to this move marks the transition of the rural population and its
structures of government to an urban setting.
z Translated by Michael Black.
z Boris Svartzman is a doctoral research fellow at the EHESS-CECMC
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77. Shares can change hands, but the number of shares is determined by the number of inhabitants
at the time of the eviction and cannot be increased in case of births or decreased by deaths. 
78. At the time of writing this article, I had not been able to find information other than witness ac-
counts of the functioning of these economic unions. However, Hou Xiaoshuo has suggested the
term “community capitalism” to describe the new economic structures that allow village com-
munities to enter the market without abandoning collective interests. See her article, “From Mao
to the Market: Community Capitalism in Rural China,” Theory Culture Society, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2011,
pp. 46-68.
79. Until 2002, when they obtained their non-rural hukou.
80. Besides, following the relocation of Xiaodao inhabitants, parents could place their children in one
of three primary schools of the neighbourhood, whereas there was only one primary school on
the island. On access to education for migrant children, see Chloé Froissart, “The Hazards of the
Right to an Education,” China Perspectives, No. 48, July-August 2003, pp. 21-36.
81. “Response to ‘The problem of pensions and other such problems raised by Huang Jienan and other
members of the mass,’” Letter from the Subdistrict Office, 31 May 2012.
82. Ibid.
83. Residents gave me two satirical posters created in 2012 that mock officials responsible for relo-
cation, who were photographed by local dwellers with cell phones during altercations in front of
the Guangzhou City Hall. 
84. Urban dwellers hold a “non-rural hukou,” not an “urban hukou.”
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